一个声称对在埃及的路边广告牌上展示色情录像负有责任的黑客团体告诉《开罗报告》，它利用了影响几个国家数字广告屏幕的软件脆弱性，揭露了它所描述的商业运营基础设施普遍存在的安全故障。
称成员通过大约两小时的自动扫描发现了数千个暴露在外的系统
该报道紧接着10月29日周四发生的事件，当时一个大型电子告示牌上出现了性明显的镜头，俯瞰该国最繁忙的高速公路之一——7月26日吉萨走廊，连接开罗及其西郊。
社交媒体流传的视频显示画面在屏幕上播放，促使当局暂停沿途的广告展示，并展开调查。
受影响的广告牌由阿拉伯联合公司(Arabian United)运营，这是联合媒体服务公司(UMS)，埃及与情报相关的媒体集团和沙特上市的阿拉伯承包服务公司(Arabian Contracting Services Co)成立的埃及-沙特广告企业。
埃及内政部星期四晚间发表声明，将此事归咎于对国际广告公司网站的入侵
该部没有查明该国际公司、受影响国家或任何嫌疑人。 报告也没有就所指控的网站违规情况如何转化为对路边广告展示的控制作出任何技术解释。
该团体的叙述大致支持该部对国际事件的描述，但提供了不同的技术细节。
在与《开罗报告》的交流中，一位代表称集团发言的人利用了将内容传送到LED显示器的软件中的弱点，而不是针对埃及公告牌。
在负责向LED显示器传输内容的软件中，称是一个真正的弱点。 “在利用它之后，我们不仅在埃及，而且还在马来西亚、巴西、中国和其他国家获得了使用展示系统的机会。”
该名人士补充说，基础设施并非埃及的专属设施，而且存在多种安全缺陷，包括通过该系统自己的网页和接口可进入的弱点。
该代表询问，这项行动是利用未知的软件脆弱性，还是仅仅利用暴露在公共互联网上的受保护程度低的设备，他描述了一个软件缺陷，但没有提供足够的技术证据来确定确切的方法。
该代表称，该小组通过自动扫描而不是选择特定公司或国家来确定目标。
“这些系统是通过自动和随机扫描确定的”，他们称称，并补充说，使用网上假名Never、19ylegal、CH和Nivex的几个参与者在大约两个小时内参与查明数千个暴露的系统。
该代表分享了事件期间的视觉记录，并提到该团体公共Telegram频道的材料。
该频道的地址在埃及告示牌上展示的色情材料上可见，使《开罗报告》能够追踪并联系其管理人员。
在最初的公开声明中，该团体称的目标是揭露安全失误，而不是要求付款或进行赎金攻击。
称声明“公司要数百万人在多国建设基础设施
该集团还拒绝了控制屏幕需要先进技术能力的想法。
其代表对《开罗报告》说
也许最重要的是，入侵的融资质疑阿拉伯联合公司的网络安全监督，其股东包括埃及国家最具政治影响力的媒体公司之一。
UMS是埃及情报总局(General Intelligence Service)的媒体部门，成立于2016年，控制超过40家公司，跨越电视，报纸，数字媒体，娱乐，广告。
然而，公告牌的运营商Arabian United成立于2022年，由UMS公司与沙特阿拉伯最大的户外广告企业之一Arabian Contracting Services公司合作成立。
根据沙特公司2025年年度报告，其埃及子公司经营着包括239个数字装置在内的1,926个广告广告牌网络，遍布开罗，吉萨，亚历山大和北海岸。
沙特公司在Arabian United公司拥有49.99%的股权，但根据2026年3月的财务报表，该公司通过在董事会中占57%的代表权行使有效的公司控制权。
该公司的年度报告称监督、管理和运营埃及广告过程的每个阶段，从安装屏幕和确保广告客户安全到展示广告内容。
这种责任分工很重要，因为内政部将事件归咎于一个“国际服务提供者”，而没有指明它或解释它与埃及经营者的合同关系。
当被问及该事件对与埃及情报有关的广告业的安全能力有何说明时，该集团的代表称这种机构联系并不能防止技术弱点。
代表称指出，“如果与埃及情报有联系的公司经营的基础设施可能受损，这种联系不一定转化为强大的网络安全。”
显然，与UMS的联系没有确定埃及情报机构负责管理被破坏的系统。 然而，它确实将这一事件置于一个与安全机构有联系的商业网络中，该网络扩大了它在埃及一些受到最严密监督的公共场所的存在。
Arabian United承认入侵，说一个不明方擅自进入其广告屏幕。
称公司立即暂停了屏幕，正与当局协调调查这一事件，该公司“仍然致力于最高的安全和业务标准”。
当天早些时候，安全人士告诉Al-Shorouk说，调查人员正在“审查这些录像是外部入侵造成的还是由负责操作屏幕的人上传的”。
这起事件也暴露了政府对路边广告内容的广泛监管与对广告日益依赖的数字系统实行公开披露的保障措施之间的差距。
根据2020年第208号法律，埃及设立了国家路边广告管理局，向总理报告。 其理事会包括国防部、内政部、交通部以及其他政府机构的代表。
当局负责制定路边广告标准，包括有关“公共秩序和道德”的要求。
在2025年9月的一次会议上，总理穆斯塔法·马德布利强调必须“规范公共道路上的广告，特别是“遵守埃及社会价值观和保护城市景观 ”。
监管框架和政府最新声明都没有解释网络安全标准适用于遥控广告网络
内政部称的法律程序已经开始，但没有具体说明调查是否将审查埃及经营者或其承包商的失误。
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A hacking group claiming responsibility for displaying pornographic footage on a roadside billboard in Egypt told The Cairo Report that it exploited a software vulnerability affecting digital advertising screens in several countries, exposing what it described as widespread security failures in commercially operated infrastructure.
The group, which operates a Telegram channel called ‘Leakers$’, said its members discovered thousands of exposed systems through an automated scan lasting approximately two hours, during which it identified Iraq, Malaysia, Brazil, and China among the countries where it said it gained access to display systems.
The account follows an incident Thursday, Oct. 29, when sexually explicit footage appeared on a large electronic billboard overlooking one of the busiest highways in the country, the 26 July Corridor in Giza, which connects Cairo with its western suburbs.
Videos circulated on social media showed the footage playing on the screen, prompting authorities to suspend advertising displays along the road and open an investigation.
The affected billboard is operated by Arabian United, an Egyptian-Saudi advertising venture established by United Media Services (UMS), Egypt’s intelligence-linked media conglomerate, and Saudi-listed Arabian Contracting Services Co.
In a statement Thursday evening, Egypt’s Interior Ministry attributed the incident to the hacking of an unnamed international advertising company’s website, saying the same footage had appeared on screens in several countries simultaneously.
The ministry did not identify the international company, the countries affected, or any suspects. It also gave no technical explanation of how the alleged website breach translated into control over roadside advertising displays.
The group’s account broadly supports the ministry’s description of an international incident but provides a different level of technical detail.
In an exchange with The Cairo Report, a person speaking on behalf of the group said its members had exploited a vulnerability in the software used to transmit content to LED displays, rather than targeting the Egyptian billboard individually.
“It was a genuine vulnerability in the software responsible for transmitting content to LED displays,” the person said. “After exploiting it, we gained access to display systems in several countries, not just Egypt, but also Malaysia, Brazil, China, and others.”
The person added that the infrastructure was not exclusive to Egypt and contained multiple security flaws, including weaknesses accessible through the system’s own pages and interfaces.
Asked whether the operation involved exploiting an unknown software vulnerability or merely accessing poorly protected equipment exposed to the public internet, the representative described a software flaw but did not provide enough technical evidence to establish the precise method.
According to the representative, the group located its targets through automated scanning rather than selecting particular companies or countries.
“The systems were identified through an automated and random scan,” they said, adding that several participants using the online pseudonyms Never, 19ylegal, CH and Nivex were involved in identifying thousands of exposed systems over approximately two hours.
The representative shared visual records captured during the incident and referred to material on the group’s public Telegram channel.
The channel’s address was visible on the pornographic material displayed on the Egyptian billboard, allowing The Cairo Report to trace it and contact its administrators.
In its initial public statement, the group said its objective was to expose security failures rather than demand payment or carry out a ransomware attack.
“Companies charge millions to build infrastructure across multiple countries and leave LED screens and billboard networks wide open on the internet without basic protection,” the statement said.
The group also rejected the idea that taking control of the screens required advanced technical capabilities.
“It wasn’t nearly as complex an operation as many might imagine,” its representative told The Cairo Report.
Perhaps most importantly, the intrusion raises questions about cybersecurity oversight at Arabian United, whose shareholders include one of the Egyptian state’s most politically influential media companies.
UMS, the media arm of Egypt’s General Intelligence Service, was established in 2016 and controls more than 40 companies across television, newspapers, digital media, entertainment, and advertising.
The billboard’s operator, Arabian United, however, was established in 2022 through a partnership between UMS and Arabian Contracting Services Co., one of Saudi Arabia’s largest outdoor advertising businesses.
According to the Saudi company’s 2025 annual report, its Egyptian subsidiary operates a network of 1,926 advertising billboards, including 239 digital installations, across Cairo, Giza, Alexandria and the North Coast.
The Saudi company holds a 49.99% ownership stake in Arabian United but exercises effective corporate control through its 57% representation on the board of directors, according to its March 2026 financial statements.
The company’s annual report also says it supervises, manages, and operates every stage of the advertising process in Egypt, from installing screens and securing advertising clients to displaying their content.
That division of responsibilities is significant because the Interior Ministry attributed the incident to an “international service provider” without identifying it or explaining its contractual relationship with the Egyptian operator.
When asked what the incident suggested about the security capabilities of an advertising business associated with Egyptian intelligence, the group’s representative said such institutional connections offered no guarantee against technical weaknesses.
“If infrastructure operated by a company linked to Egyptian intelligence can be compromised, it demonstrates that such connections do not necessarily translate into strong cybersecurity,” the representative said.
Obviously, the association with UMS does not establish that Egyptian intelligence agencies were responsible for administering the compromised systems. It does, however, place the incident within a security apparatus-linked commercial network that has expanded its presence across some of Egypt’s most heavily monitored public spaces.
Arabian United acknowledged the intrusion, saying an unknown party had gained unauthorized access to one of its advertising screens.
The company said it had immediately suspended the screen, was investigating the incident in coordination with authorities, and that it “remained committed to the highest security and operating standards.”
Earlier in the day, security sources told Al-Shorouk that investigators were “examining whether the footage resulted from an external intrusion or had been uploaded by someone responsible for operating the screen.”
The incident also exposes a gap between the government’s extensive regulation of roadside advertising content and the publicly disclosed safeguards governing the digital systems on which that advertising increasingly depends.
Under Law No. 208 of 2020, Egypt established the National Authority for the Regulation of Roadside Advertising, reporting to the prime minister. Its board includes representatives of the defense, interior, and transport ministries, among other government bodies.
The authority is responsible for setting standards governing roadside advertising, including requirements concerning “public order and morality.”
At a September 2025 meeting, prime minister Mostafa Madbouly emphasized the need to “regulate advertising on public roads,” particularly “compliance with Egyptian societal values and the protection of the urban landscape.”
Neither that regulatory framework nor the government’s latest statements explain what cybersecurity standards apply to remotely operated advertising networks, whether the affected operator had undergone a security assessment, or who bears responsibility for auditing third-party software connected to publicly visible screens.
The Interior Ministry said legal procedures had been initiated but did not specify whether the investigation would examine failures by the Egyptian operator or its contractors.
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