10月30日晚间，传音控股（688036.SH）发布2026年三季报，数据未能延续上半年的“修复”势头，反而勾勒出一条“失速”曲线。
与此同时，10月15日挂牌的传音H股（HK2636）仍在发行价附近上下徘徊：日成交量仅数十万股，换手率多在1%以下，较A股折价近五成，隐隐透出被边缘化的“僵尸股”气息，也让公司历时10个月才完成的“A+H”上市显得颇为尴尬。
传音控股是全球新兴市场手机销量第一的消费电子企业，在非洲的市场份额一度超过六成，“非洲手机之王”之名由此而来。
2023年至2024年是公司近20年成长史上最高光的两年：营收分别达623亿元、687亿元，归母净利润连续两年超过55亿元，传音由此成为中国消费电子出海最成功的样板之一。然而到了2025年，AI数据中心虹吸存储产能所引发的涨价冲击，令传音控股的短板暴露无遗。
这轮被称为“存储通胀”的超级周期，并非传统意义上由消费电子需求回暖带动的普涨，而是源于供给侧的结构性再分配：三星、SK海力士、美光等原厂将产能大规模转向HBM（高带宽内存）、服务器DRAM、企业级SSD等高利润的AI相关产品，挤占了手机、PC所需的LPDDR4X、DDR4等通用存储产能，导致消费电子领域可用的存储供给急剧收紧。
作为低端手机的代表性厂商，传音控股的成长高度依赖新兴市场的人口红利、换机周期和成本红利，以及公司多年练就的“需求理解＋快速产品化＋成本控制”复合能力。这种模式的脆弱性在于：利润率的提升更多来自规模效应和成本控制，而非技术溢价，一旦宏观或供应链条件逆转，受到的冲击也最为剧烈。
2025年，身处“震中”的传音迅速从巅峰跌至“半山腰”，随即展开全面应对。2026年上半年的业绩显示，第一轮应对有效，但效果有限，进入三季度业绩再度疲软。
眼下的状况是：毛利率阵地尚能勉力坚守，但规模、利润额、现金流乃至资产负债表这“四方阵地”，即便不算失守，也已被撞开缺口。公司一面继续“囤芯”，一面押注AI推动高端化转型，目的都是为自己寻找一条可持续的生存路径。
这场生存实验的结局，不仅关乎传音一家公司的命运，更关乎“没有技术定价权”的整个低端手机行业在存储超级周期中的集体命运。
出海标杆，手机业的“异类”
中国的手机玩家大致分两类：一类是品牌厂商（业内常称“手机OEM”），拥有自有品牌，产品由自有工厂生产或部分交由代工厂制造，如华为、小米、OPPO、vivo、荣耀、传音；另一类是为品牌提供设计与制造服务的ODM（原始设计制造商）及代工厂，如华勤技术、龙旗科技、立讯精密等。
在品牌厂商阵营中，传音控股堪称“异类”：总部在深圳，研发和产能也多在国内，“主战场”却远在八千公里之外的非洲。
传音的起点带有浓重的“波导印记”——创始团队和核心管理层多出自波导，实控人竺兆江曾任波导销售公司常务副总经理、国际业务部总经理，是波导海外市场的负责人。2006年，竺兆江离开波导创业，选择了一条当时几乎无人看好的路——绕开国内，直插非洲。
这条与华为、小米、vivo等同行迥异的成长道路，背后的战略逻辑其实很简单：彼时的非洲市场手机渗透率极低、竞争格局松散、国际品牌重视不足，且消费者对价格的敏感度远高于对品牌溢价的追求。这恰好契合波导系的几项基因：低价竞争、重广告投入、重线下渠道，而相对轻研发。
传音在海外手机市场20年的发展历程，正是这套基因的规模化实践：先以四卡四待、超长续航、深肤色影像算法等“技术门槛不高、市场洞察门槛极高”的微创新快速立足，再以itel、TECNO、Infinix三大品牌覆盖从入门到中端的价格带，辅以一张由2900多家经销商织成、从国包（国家级总代理）延伸至乡镇的分销网络，最终把非洲手机市场做成了自家后院，继而将这套打法复制到南亚、东南亚、中东、拉美等其他新兴市场。
2019年登陆科创板时，传音已被冠以“非洲手机之王”的称号；2023年以来，按IDC口径，其手机（含功能机）出货量稳居全球第三；据弗若斯特沙利文统计，其非洲手机市场销量份额一度高达61.5%。
2023年和2024年是传音控股的巅峰时期。这两年里，一年创下“利润增速峰值”——2023年归母净利润55.37亿元，同比增长122.93%；另一年创下“营收规模峰值”——2024年营收在2023年622.95亿元的基础上进一步增至687.15亿元。
但在营收创下公司史上新高的同时，2024年归母净利润几乎零增长（同比增长0.22%），扣非净利润更同比下滑11.54%。增长动能衰减，已预示其“低价走量”模式可能接近天花板。恰在此时，一场始料未及的外部冲击降临。
存储风暴与上市以来最差的一年
2025年至今，全球存储芯片（DRAM与NAND Flash）市场经历了一轮由AI算力需求驱动的超级涨价周期。这轮涨价始于2025年年初三大原厂将逐步停产DDR4等旧制程产品的消息，4月起加速升温，三季度起全面进入超级涨价通道。
存储本是强周期行业，每隔几年就会上演一轮从涨价到崩盘的轮回（过往有2012—2015年、2016—2019年、2021—2023年三轮），但这一轮涨价的疯狂程度堪称历史级：被原厂宣告停产的DDR4，其16Gb颗粒现货价一年间从约3.2美元飙至62美元以上，涨幅约1800%；DDR5 16Gb颗粒现货价从约4.6美元涨至28美元，涨幅超过500%；
据Counterpoint统计，64GB服务器内存条（RDIMM）合约价更是从2025年三季度的255美元，一路涨至2026年一季度的900美元以上。
存储芯片是消费电子的“粮仓”，如今更已跃升为手机物料清单（BOM）中最大的单项成本。IDC测算，低端机型的存储成本占比已从过去的10%至15%抬升至40%至50%；Omdia的估算更高，99美元以下机型的这一比例超过64%。
在原厂、模组厂、代工厂、手机品牌直至消费者的产业链条上，存储涨价演变成了一场“成本甩锅赛”：各方都想把暴涨的存储成本转嫁给下游，越往上游，定价权越强；越往下游，转嫁能力越弱。
传音控股的商业模式本质上属于“极致成本控制+走量”型，产品结构高度集中于中低端，主力机型售价多在150美元以下——2025年其智能机平均售价仅566元，约合80美元。
这一定位决定了其在存储涨价周期中的极端脆弱性：身处链条末端、价格带最低、存储成本占比高、终端提价空间小、目标客群价格敏感度极高，多重压力叠加，使其成为本轮周期中受冲击最深的手机厂商之一。
历史上，传音控股并非第一次面对危机，以往大体都能凭借供应链管理上的灵活性顺利“过冬”：在功能机向智能机切换期，凭借供应链与渠道优势完成平稳过渡；非洲部分国家的汇率危机中，通过本地化定价与外汇管理对冲风险；疫情缺芯期间，靠提前备货与供应链多元化保障了供应。
然而，这次的“存储芯片供应危机”不仅烈度远超以往，性质也更为复杂。
“存储供应紧张是智能手机行业近年来影响较大的供给侧事件之一。不同于新冠疫情、2022—2023年期间由需求端引发的市场放缓，当前的市场收缩难以通过常规的定价调整、渠道优化或产品规划手段化解。”市场研究机构Counterpoint Research首席分析师Yang Wang表示，“中低端OEM厂商正陷入成本上涨难以消化，与消费者购买力存在刚性约束的双重困境。”
从传音控股2025年的实际表现来看，其应对更多是被动跟随，而非前瞻布局。结果是，2025年交出了上市以来最难看的成绩单：营收同比下滑4.55%至655.91亿元；归母净利润同比暴跌53.49%至25.81亿元，为上市以来首次腰斩，其中四季度单季扣非净利润仅2.41亿元；
毛利率跌至19.15%的上市以来低点；净利率由2024年的约8.1%降至约3.9%，跌幅过半；股价则从2025年9月25日104.9元的高点一路下挫，不到半年跌幅即超过四成。
这场冲击如同一次压力测试，照出了传音的软肋与短板。2025年12月30日，距三季报发布已两月有余，董事长竺兆江带队召开2025年第三季度业绩说明会，会上公司一度饱受诟病。
据会后披露的投资者关系活动记录表，多数提问都或多或少“夹枪带棒”，更有两轮“炮轰”级别的质询：一是直指公司在存储危机中噤声失语，只顾埋头推进赴港上市；二是矛头指向股价高位时的控股股东询价转让和员工减持，质问是否存在内幕交易。对此，公司只给出了程式化的回应。
这一幕，为传音控股在“存储危机”第一年的表现，添上了“应对不力”的注脚。
对冲“三板斧”：囤芯、提价、高端化
传音的应对始于2025年下半年，至2026年上半年全面铺开。其中最显眼的动作是战略备货：存货从2025年末的89.03亿元升至2026年3月末的142.2亿元，6月末再增至189.35亿元。“待售产品和原材料大概各占（存货的）一半，原材料当中绝大多数是存储。”传音控股相关人士坦言。
通常，存储芯片的流转路径是：模组厂先向三星、SK海力士、美光、长鑫、长江存储等存储原厂采购晶圆或颗粒，搭配自研或外购的主控芯片和固件，经封装测试、主控适配、固件调校等工序，制成eMMC、UFS、LPDDR、eMCP等手机可直接使用的嵌入式存储产品，再销售给手机厂商。非头部手机品牌，大多只能从模组厂采购成品。
传音控股的“囤芯”模式，则把备货拆成了两个环节。“我们都是去跟原厂谈判拿货，然后再给模组厂付一个加工费。”传音控股相关人士称。
不过，在存储涨价、货源偏紧的背景下，头部模组厂对这类客供料加工订单兴趣并不大——销售包含主控、固件和封测等附加值的自营产品，显然比赚取单一加工费更有吸引力。
“假如自营产品订单很满，我们肯定不会让出产能去做代加工。”佰维存储（688525.SH）相关人士称。
江波龙（301308.SZ）方面也坦言：“能从原厂拿到货是基于我们业内约30年的积累，虽然不会去特意炒货，但这部分该赚的钱还是要赚。”
在此背景下，传音控股只能加码以资本纽带强化供应链协同：2026年9月8日江波龙在港股上市时，传音旗下传音国际认购2500万美元，为最大单笔基石投资；此外，传音还斥资1.58亿元认购了长鑫科技约0.03%的股权。
“先从原厂买料，再把这些客供料交给模组厂加工”的模式属于“非线性备货”，好处是可以提前锁定部分货源和采购成本，避免为模组成品中的库存溢价及额外加价买单。“我们计成本的计价方式是加权平均，不是先进先出，所以存储涨价对成本的影响就会出现一定的滞后。”传音控股相关人士称。
据介绍，在加权平均法（传音半年报附注披露为“移动加权平均法”）下，传音结转成本时并非先把低价芯片全部用完，再开始使用高价芯片，而是将新旧库存混合核算。
比如，先后买入数量相同的两批芯片，单价分别为100元和200元，产品售出时结转的单位成本约为150元；随着高价采购越来越多，平均成本才会逐步向200元靠拢。
而“非线性备货”的代价是：更多的库存和资金占用需由传音自己（而非模组厂）承担。2026年上半年，传音控股经营活动产生的现金流量净额已降至负58.61亿元，前三季度累计进一步扩大至负98.73亿元。
即便押上巨额现金，也难以抵挡超级涨价周期的力道。“相对很多小厂想拿货（原厂裸片）都拿不到的情况，我们拿货是没有问题，不过价格没法锁定。”传音控股相关人士称，“因为和原厂谈的即便都是合约价，但合约价也得要随市价浮动。”据其H股招股书披露，传音存储芯片的平均采购单价2023年约为49.5元，2024年、2025年仅温和升至67.8元、70.3元，到了2026年前四个月，则骤然涨到192元。
“囤芯”可以延缓成本上涨的速度，本质是用现金和库存风险换取一段成本时间差，但成本上升迟早要传导到报表上。传音控股招股资料显示，存储芯片在已售存货成本中的占比，已从2025年的28%升至2026年前四个月的48.4%，超过SoC和屏幕成为第一大物料。要想保住毛利率，就必须在“囤芯”争取到的时间窗口里完成提价和产品结构调整。
“今年我们新品发布节奏，基本上是每个季度会出一款，每发新品我们也都会做提价。”传音控股相关人士称，“虽然涨价了，但除了存储之外，其他很多配置都进行升级，让消费者觉得接受涨价这钱花得值。”
提价之外，传音控股还主动上移产品结构，削减入门机型，把资源向中高端倾斜。
“我们内部是把150美金以上的产品归入中高端，之前销量占比可能就个位数，今年上半年就到16%、17%了。”传音控股相关人士称，“因为整个行业，存储价格在那摆着，想把它传导出去只能多做点中高端用户，也就是那些能付得起的用户。”
其港股招股书显示，2026年上半年，传音智能机销量由上年同期的4450万部降至3950万部，减少约11.2%；平均售价则从547.5元升至713.4元，上涨约30.3%。
低基数修复，三季度二度失速
这套组合拳在2026年上半年可谓立竿见影：营收354.31亿元，同比增长21.85%；归母净利润17.73亿元，同比增长46.22%；扣非净利润14.80亿元，同比增长64.98%；毛利率由上年同期的20.09%升至22.63%，二季度单季达到23.16%。
但这些增长主要建立在2025年利润腰斩后的低基数之上。若与2024年同期相比，营收仅增长2.53%，归母净利润和扣非净利润则仍分别低37.82%和39.03%。这说明其收入规模已大致恢复，盈利能力却远未回到2024年的水平。
果然，这种低基数上的修复，没能延续到三季度。
传音控股三季报显示，三季度单季营收148.49亿元，同比下降27.45%，较二季度的192.31亿元环比下降22.79%；前三季度累计营收502.80亿元，同比仅增长1.49%，上半年21.85%的增速几乎被一个季度抹平。
三季度归母净利润8.57亿元，同比看似只降了8.40%；但扣非净利润仅4.36亿元，同比下降47.72%，环比更是下降49.40%。
归母净利润表面上的稳定，靠的是非经常性损益：三季度非经常性损益合计4.21亿元，约占归母净利润的49%，其中持有及处置金融资产、金融负债产生的损益就达4.65亿元（税前）。也就是说，主业利润近乎腰斩，是理财和股权类资产的增值托住了归母净利润。
现金流的变化更为刺眼：前三季度经营活动现金流净流出从上半年的不到59亿元扩大至近99亿元，而上年同期为净流入32.85亿元；购买商品、接受劳务支付的现金达593.95亿元，比上年同期多出143.19亿元，销售商品、提供劳务收到的现金却只多了约30亿元。
资金缺口一方面靠“掏家底”，一方面靠借钱：货币资金由年初的117.40亿元降至78.43亿元，交易性金融资产由107.35亿元降至46.98亿元；短期借款则由18.62亿元增至45.71亿元，一年内到期的非流动负债也由0.93亿元增至6.01亿元。
再考虑到同期分红及付息支出就超过20亿元，“借钱囤芯”带来的资金压力显然越来越沉重。或许正因如此，三季度传音出现了高位放缓备货的迹象：9月末存货降至173.19亿元，较6月末减少16.16亿元。
“现在存储价格虽然还在涨，但是涨速出现了大幅收窄，因此我们现在就战略性地会囤一些，不会大范围去囤。”传音控股方面人士称。即便如此，9月末存货仍较2025年末高出94.5%，约占总资产的37%。
仅仅一个季度，组合拳换来的修复便滑向了失速。
押注AI转型，H股应者寥寥
对传音控股而言，比业绩失速更深层、也更棘手的问题在于：正在推进的高端化迁移，同样不是“保险箱”。
高端化意味着离开自己最擅长的低成本、广覆盖、高渠道密度的“舒适区”，闯入三星、荣耀、小米等对手在品牌、技术、产品组合、消费分期方案与供货保障上更占优势的价格带。
相比之下，传音既无三星的垂直整合能力，也难比小米的高端化积累和华为的本土供应链优势，稍有不慎便会陷入战略上的“两头不靠”——入门市场因存储成本被迫让出，中高端市场又面对更强的对手，既丢了低价段的规模优势，又没能在高价段站稳脚跟。
传音能否在更高价位站住尚未可知；但面对存储涨价与利润塌陷的双重挤压，传音给出的“突围叙事”，是把AI作为支撑品牌溢价与估值的抓手。
港股IPO落地前的2026年，传音控股的三场投资者交流活动阵容爆棚：3月27日159家机构196人次，4月28日100家机构118人次，8月18日124家机构152人次，三次合计383家次；9月9日，公司还参加了科创板“人工智能行业”集体业绩说明会。这样的调研热度，明显高于消费电子公司的常态。
在密集的调研中，传音向投资机构展示了一份AI清单：H股募资将把AI相关技术研发列为首要投向——按最终发行价计算，募资净额约29.68亿港元，其中约四成（约11.9亿港元）投向AI相关研发；技术上，涵盖可在中低端芯片上运行的30亿参数端侧模型、本地化小语种语音识别、AI自动接听、声纹降噪、通话摘要、拍照解题等；移动互联网业务围绕传音OS推进“软硬协同”；扩品类则从配件、家电一路讲到储能……
带着这幅“端侧AI+移动互联网+储能、电动出行+近3亿月活用户”的远景，传音控股启动了H股发行。然而，尴尬随之而来。
先看发行：发售价直接定在35.30至38.80港元招股区间的下限；香港公开发售仅获4.46倍认购（热门A+H新股动辄数十倍乃至上百倍），未发生回拨，公开发售份额维持在10%；国际配售获2.55倍认购，承配人仅51名；
11家基石投资者锁定约四成发售股份，其中不乏江波龙、宏芯宇、比亚迪旗下金兴环球、联发科旗下Digimoc等产业链伙伴，江波龙更以3000万美元成为认购额最大的基石，与传音此前入股其H股形成“互为基石”；前十大承配人占国际配售的85.8%……整体数据勾勒出一幅依靠折价和基石“保发行”、而非市场“抢着要”的图景。
10月15日挂牌当日，H股开盘即破发。此后十余个交易日，股价大体在32至38港元区间震荡，多数时间低于发行价，较A股折价近五成，基石投资者普遍处于浮亏状态；日成交多为地量，换手率普遍不足1%。在今年密集登场的“A+H”新股中，传音H股的冷清颇为扎眼。
H股发行前的调研火爆与挂牌前后的冷清落寞形成鲜明反差，折射出国际资本市场对其盈利可持续性和“AI标签”的疑虑：传音把AI定为技术投入和产品升级的主方向，但管理层明确表示不直接竞争通用大模型，重点走本地化路线。在这种战略下，“AI抓手”能“抓”来多少手机之外的收入，市场心里没底。
眼下，传音的护城河（本土化能力、渠道网络与低价规模）仍在，但主力产品尚未跳出存储涨价的“重灾区”，护城河的边界正被成本上涨与竞品攻势双双侵蚀。
接下来，无论继续提价还是调整配置，传音可腾挪的空间都已十分有限：提价可能进一步压制需求，减配又可能削弱产品竞争力。在成本冲击难以完全消化的背景下，如何兼顾市场份额与盈利能力，已成为一道两难考题。
对传音控股而言，AI化转型也不再是锦上添花，而是一场关乎其能否突破增长瓶颈、重塑盈利模式的生存之战。
（本文首发钛媒体APP，文｜资本剖面，作者｜文一刀）
本文由 AI图鉴自动抓取并翻译，版权归原作者所有；如需查看原文请点下方链接。
In the evening of 30 October, the Voice Control Unit (688036.SH) publish2026 Tri-Quarterly, the data did not continue the “rehabilitation” momentum of the first half of the year, but instead plotted a “fast” curve.
At the same time, the audio H shares (HK2636), which were listed on 15 October, continue to hover near and below the distribution price: the daily turnover is only hundreds of thousands, with a turnover of less than 1 per cent, nearly 50 per cent above the A share, concealing a marginal “Zombie Stock” and making the listing of “A+H” that took the company 10 months to complete.
Pronunciation control is the world's leading consumer electronics business in emerging markets, with a market share once exceeding 60 per cent in Africa, and the name of the “Lord of African Cellular Phones”.
From 2023 to 2024, the company ' s highest growth record in almost 20 years: 62.3 billion yuan and 68.7 billion yuan respectively, with net profits to the mother exceeding 5.5 billion yuan for two years in a row, has been heard as one of the most successful examples of China ' s consumer electronic access to the sea. By 2025, however, the price-breeding shock caused by the iris storage capacity of the AI data centre exposed the short panel of the audio-control stock.
This round, known as the “storage of inflation” supercycle, is not traditionally driven by a warming of consumer electronic demand, but rather by structural redistribution on the supply side: the large-scale shift of production capacity to high-profit AI-related products such as HBM (high bandwidth memory), servers, DRAM, enterprise-level SSD, etc., which crowds out mobile phones, LPDDR4X, DDR4 and others, leading to a sharp tightening of available storage supplies in consumer electronics.
As a representative manufacturer of low-end mobile phones, the growth of voice-control shares is highly dependent on emerging market demographic dividends, switch cycles and cost dividends, as well as the complex capacity of companies to “demand understanding + rapid productization + cost control” that has been practiced over the years. The vulnerability of this model lies in the fact that the increase in profitability is more derived from scale effects and cost controls than from technology premiums, with the most severe shocks if macro or supply chain conditions are reversed.
In 2025, the sound of an “earthquake” quickly fell from the top to the “half-mountain” and then began a comprehensive response. Performance in the first half of 2026 showed that the first round of response was effective but limited, with again weak performance into the third quarter.
The current situation is that the Māori-rate position is still holding up, but the “quartet” position of size, profit, cash flow and even balance sheets, if not defaulted, has broken the gap. While the company continues to “grow cores” and is betting on AI to drive a high-end transformation, the aim is to find a sustainable path to survival for itself.
The outcome of this survival experiment is not only the fate of the pronunciation company, but also the collective fate of the entire low-end mobile phone industry in the storage supercycle.
Out of the sea pole, cell phone "others"
Mobile phone players in China are broadly divided into two categories: brand manufacturers (commonly known as “cell phones” in the industry) with their own brands, products produced by their own factories or partially produced by their successors, such as Huai, Mi, OPPO, vivo, glory, pronunciation; and ODM, which provides design and manufacturing services for brands, as well as alternative factories, such as Huaqin technology, Dragon flag technology, and high-quality radios.
In brand-branding firms, voice-control shares are called “unsegregated”: in Shenzhen, where there is much R & D and capacity in the country, the “primary battlefield” is located in Africa, 8,000 kilometres away.
The starting point for the pronunciation is a heavy “broadprint” — the founding team and the core management were more guided than ever, and the physical control officer, Zhumujiang, was the Managing Director of the Bosei Marketing Company, the Managing Director of the International Operations Department and the head of the Bosei overseas market. In 2006, the Zhongmong River left the Boeing Enterprise and chose a path that was virtually unwelcome at the time — bypassing the country and moving directly into Africa.
The strategic logic behind this path of growth, which is very different from those of China, Mi and Vivo, is simple: At a time when Africa ' s market has very low penetration of mobile phones, loose competition patterns, low international brand attention and consumer sensitivity to prices far outweighs the pursuit of brand premiums. This coincides with several genes in the wave-guided system: low-cost competition, heavy advertising inputs, heavy sub-line channels, and relatively light research and development.
The micro-innovations of four-calories, ultra-extension, dark-coloured image algorithms, etc., are fast-tracked, with the three brands of TecCO and Infinix covering the entry-to-middle price bands, supplemented by a distribution network made up of more than 2,900 distributors and extended from the State purse (general agents at the national level) to the townships, eventually turning the African mobile market into its own home, and then replicating it to other emerging markets such as South Asia, South-East Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America.
In 2019, the pronunciation was crowned “The King of Mobile Phones in Africa”; since 2023, mobile phones (functional machines) have been the third most stable in the world by IDC caliber; and, according to Frost Sullivan, their share of mobile phone sales in Africa was once as high as 61.5 per cent.
The years 2023 and 2024 were the peak periods of pronunciation. In both years, the “peak of profit” peaked in one year — $5,537 million in net profits to the mother in 2023, an increase of 122.93 per cent over the same year; in the other year, the “ceiling peak” — a further increase from $62,295 million in 2024 to $68,715 million.
However, at the same time as the start-up of the company was at its highest level in history, in 2024 net profits to mothers grew almost zero (0.22 per cent over the same period) and net profits to the lower of 11.54 per cent. The growth kinetic energy decline has suggested that its “low-cost walk” model may be close to the ceiling. This coincided with an unexpected external shock.
The worst year since the storm was stored on the market.
From 2025 to the present, the global storage chip (DRAM and NAND Flash) market has experienced a super-price cycle driven by AI ' s computing needs. The round price increase began with the news that the production of older products, such as the DDR4, would be phased out at the beginning of 2025 at the three main original plants, with the acceleration of warming in April and full entry into the super-price increase path in three quarters.
Storage is a strong-cycle industry, with roundbacks from price increases to crashes occurring every few years (up from three rounds in 2012-2015, 2016-2019 and 2021-2023), but the level of craziness of this round increases is historical: DDR4, which was declared out of production by the original plant, with spot prices of 16 Gb particles rising from about $3.2 to more than $62 a year, an increase of about 180 per cent; and DDR5,16Gb particles increasing from about $4.6 to $28, an increase of over 500 per cent;
According to Counterpoint, the contract price for the 64GB server memory book (RDIM) increased from $255 in the third quarter of 2025 to over $900 in the first quarter of 2026.
The storage of chips is an electronic “food warehouse” and has now jumped to the largest single cost in the mobile phone material list (BOM). The IDC calculated that storage costs for low-end machines had risen from 10 to 15 per cent in the past to 40 to 50 per cent; the estimates for Omdia were higher, with over 64 per cent for less than $99.
In the industrial chain from the original plant, the model factory, the substitute factory, the mobile phone brand to the consumer, storage price increases have evolved into a “cost-scrambling competition”: each party wants to shift the soaring storage costs to the downstream, with greater pricing power going up, and less ability to transfer.
The commercial model of voice-control is essentially a “extreme cost control + walk” model, with product structures highly concentrated at the middle and lower end, with the main machine selling at below $150 — its smart machine selling averaged only $566 in 2025, or approximately $80.
This positioning determines their extreme vulnerability in the storage price increase cycle: at the end of the chain, with the lowest price band, high storage costs, small terminal price increases, high price sensitivity of target population prices, and multiple pressures, making it one of the most affected mobile phone manufacturers in the current cycle.
Historically, the voice-control units were not the first to face a crisis and were generally able to “winter” with flexibility in supply chain management: The smooth transition through supply chain and channel advantages is achieved through the switchover of functionality to smart machines; the risk of hedging through localization of pricing and foreign exchange management in some African countries during exchange rate crises; and the availability of pre-positioning and supply chain diversification during periods of epidemic scarcity.
However, this “stolen chip supply crisis” is not only far more intense than before, but also more complex in nature.
“Strenchment of storage supply is one of the more influential supply side events in the smartphone industry in recent years. Unlike the new coronary epidemic, the slowdown in demand-driven markets between 2022 and 2023, current market contractions are difficult to resolve through conventional pricing adjustments, optimization of channels or product planning.” According to Yang Wang, Chief Analyst of the Marketpoint Research, a market research institute, “the low- and middle-end OEM producers are caught in a double dilemma of rising costs and rigid constraints on consumer purchasing power”.
In terms of the actual performance of the audio-control unit in 2025, its response is more reactive than forward-looking. As a result, in 2025, the most ugly card since the listing was handed over: a decline of 4.55 to 65,591 million yuan in the year-on-year ratio of earnings; a sharp decline of 53.49 to 2,581 million yuan in the year-on-year of net earnings from mothers, the first time since the listing, with only 241 million yuan in single-quarter deductions of non-net profits;
The Māori rate fell to a low of 19.15 per cent since it was put on the market; net interest rates fell from about 8.1 per cent in 2024 to about 3.9 per cent, more than half the decline; and stock prices collapsed from the high point of $104.9 on 25 September 2025, with a drop of over 40 per cent in less than six months.
The shock was like a stress test, showing the soft ribs and the short plate of the sound. On 30 December 2025, more than two months after publish, the third quarter of 2025 was marked by a presentation by the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Quimong Gang, at which the company suffered from a serious illness.
According to the post-conference disclosure schedule of investor relations activities, most of the questions were more or less “guns with sticks” and two rounds of “bunfire”-level questioning: one pointed directly to the company's silence during the storage crisis, with the sole aim of moving to the port for listing; and the other pointed at the holding shareholders when the stock price was high, asking about the transfer and the loss of staff, asking whether there were insider transactions. In response, the company provided only a programmatic response.
This scene added a “deficient” footnote to the performance of the voice control unit in the first year of the “storage crisis”.
Pumping the "three axes": core hoarding, price increases, high end
The pronunciation response began in the second half of 2025 and was fully rolled out by the first half of 2026. The most notable of these was the strategic provision: from $8.903 billion at the end of 2025 to $14.22 billion at the end of March 2026, to $18.935 billion at the end of June. “The products and raw materials to be sold are about half of each (inventory) and the vast majority of the raw materials are stored.” Pronunciation-control related persons speak out.
Typically, the flow path for the storage chip is that the model plant first procures a crystal circle or particles from the original storage plant, such as Samsung, SK Hercules, Mizuen, Yangtze and Yangtze, along with self-researched or externally purchased master-controlled chips and solids, and is then sold to the mobile phone manufacturer as a directly usable embedded storage product for eMC, UFS, LPDDR, eMCP, etc. Most of the non-head cell phone brands can only be procured from modular plants.
The sound-control “mocking” model, which is two steps down, says, “We're all going to negotiate with the original plant and then pay a processing fee for the module. "The pronunciation shares are said to be related.
However, against the backdrop of higher storage prices and tight supply, head-models are not very interested in such customer supply processing orders — the sale of self-employed products containing added value such as master control, solids and seals is clearly more attractive than earning a single processing fee.
“If the self-employed product orders are full, we will certainly not allow the production capacity to be processed on a proxy basis.” According to the persons concerned.
The Jiang Poloon (301308.SZ) also stated: “The ability to obtain goods from the plant is based on the accumulation of some 30 years in our industry, which, although it is not intended to fire, still earn this portion of the money.”
In this context, voice holding shares can only be added to enhance supply chain synergy by capital ties: On 8 September 2026, when Jiang Polo was on the market in Hong Kong shares, Voice International claimed $25 million for the largest single building block investment; in addition, the Voice claimed a share of approximately 0.03 per cent of Changsung technology at a cost of $158 million.
The model of “buying from the original plant and then handing over the customer supplies to the modular plant for processing” is a “non-linear reserve”, which has the advantage of pre-locking some of the sources and procurement costs and avoiding the purchase of stock premiums and additional premiums in the model composition. “... Our cost calculation is based on weighted averages, not first-in-first-out, so there is some lag in the cost implications of storage price increases. "The pronunciation shares are said to be related.
It was explained that under the weighted average method (the semi-annual sounding note was disclosed as a “mobile weighted average”), the cost of carrying the sound was not the first to exhaust all low-value chips and then begin to use high-value chips, but rather to mix old and new stocks.
For example, two batches of identical chips were purchased at a unit price of $100 and $200, respectively, and the unit cost carried forward from the sale of the product was approximately $150; as more and more purchases were made, the average cost would converge towards $200.
The cost of “non-linear goods” is that more stocks and funds will have to be carried out by the pronunciation itself (not by the modular plant). In the first half of 2026, net cash flows from the activities of audio-controlled holdings had fallen to negative $5,861 million, with the cumulative expansion to negative $9,873 million in the first three quarters.
Even with large cash deposits, it would be difficult to resist super-high cycles. “We can't get the goods, but the price cannot be locked.” According to the pronunciator concerned, “because even if the contract price was negotiated with the original plant, the contract price had to fluctuate with the market price”. According to its H share book, the average unit purchase price for audio-storage chips was approximately $49.5 in 2023, rising only to $67.8 in 2024 and $70.3 in 2025 and to $192 in the first four months of 2026.
“Gear hoarding” can slow the pace of cost escalation, essentially in exchange for a time difference in cash and inventory risk, but sooner or later the cost rise is passed on to the statement. Pronunciation control stock data show that the share of stored chips in the cost of sold inventory increased from 28 per cent in 2025 to 48.4 per cent in the first four months of 2026, with more soc and screens becoming the first largest material. If the Māori rate is to be maintained, price increases and product restructuring will have to be completed in the window of time sought by the hoarding.
“This year's new publish beat is basically a quarterly one, and we'll raise prices for every new one.” “Although the price has increased, many other configurations, apart from storage, have been upgraded to make consumers feel valued for accepting the price increase.”
In addition to the price increases, the pronunciation control shares proactively move the product structure upwards, reduce the entry type and tilt the resources to the medium and high end.
“We have internalized products of more than $150 at the middle and high end, with the previous share likely to be in single digits, reaching 16 and 17 per cent in the first half of this year.” “Because the whole industry, storage prices are set there, it is only possible to transfer it out to a few medium- and high-end users, that is, those who can afford it.”
Its share book shows that in the first half of 2026, the sales of sound-transmitting smart machines fell from 44.5 million to 39.5 million during the same period of the previous year, a decrease of about 11.2 per cent; the average price rose from $547.5 to $71.3.4 or an increase of about 30.3 per cent.
Low base figure restored, second-degree delay in the third quarter
This combination of fists was immediately visible in the first half of 2026: 35,431 million yuan, an increase of 21.85 per cent over the same period; 1,773 million yuan, an increase of 46.22 per cent over the same period; 1.48 billion yuan, an increase of 64.98 per cent over the same period, excluding non-net profits; and 23.63 per cent, an increase in the Māori rate from 20.09 per cent during the same period of the previous year to 23.16 per cent in the second quarter.
However, these increases are mainly based on the low base of profits after the end of 2025. When compared to the same period in 2024, the increase in revenue was only 2.53 per cent, the net profit to the mother and the deduction of non-net profits were still 37.82 per cent and 39.03 per cent, respectively. This suggests that income levels have largely recovered, while profitability is far from returning to its level in 2024.
Indeed, the rehabilitation of this low base figure did not last until three quarters.
According to the Quarterly News, the three-quarter single-season camp received $14,849 million, a decrease of 27.45 per cent over the same period, a decrease of 22.79 per cent from the 19,231 million ring ratio in the second quarter; and the cumulative three- quarters received $50,280 million, an increase of 1.49 per cent over the same period, with the rate of increase of 21.85 per cent in the first half of the year being almost flatened by one quarter.
The net profit due to the mother in the three quarters was $857 million, or only 8.40 per cent less than in the same period; but only $436 million less than the net profit, or 47.72 per cent less than in the same period, or 49.40 per cent less than in the ring.
Net profits to the mother are ostensibly stable, based on non-recurrent gains and losses: Non-recurring gains and losses in the three quarters totalled $421 million, or approximately 49 per cent of the net profits attributed to the mother, of which gains and losses arising from the holding and disposal of financial assets and liabilities amounted to $465 million (pre-tax). In other words, the profits of the main industry are close to being cut off, and the value added of assets in the financial and equity categories is dependent on net returns to the mother.
The changes in cash flows are even more striking: the net outflow of operating cash flows increased from less than $5.9 billion in the first half of the year to nearly $9.9 billion, compared to a net inflow of $3.285 billion during the same period of the previous year; cash received for the purchase of goods and services amounted to $5.9395 billion, an increase of $14.319 billion over the same period of the previous year, while cash received for the sale of goods and services was only about $3 billion.
The funding gap is based on “take-out” and borrowing: monetary funds fell from $11,740 million at the beginning of the year to $7,843 million, transactional financial assets from $10,735 million to $4,698 million, short-term borrowing from $1,862 million to $4,571 million and non-current liabilities due in one year to $601 million.
Taking into account that over the same period, dividends and interest payments exceed $2 billion, it is clear that the financial pressure of “loaning cores” is increasing. Perhaps this is why the three-quarter pronunciation shows signs of a high slowdown in the delivery: At the end of September, the stock fell to $17,319 million, a decrease of $1,616 million compared to the end of June.
“The price of storage is still rising, but the rate of increase has been significantly narrowed, so we are now strategically hoarding some, and not on a large scale.” According to audio-control sources. Even so, inventory at the end of September was 94.5 per cent higher than at the end of 2025, accounting for approximately 37 per cent of total assets.
In just one quarter, the restoration of the combined fists slipped to a lack of speed.
I'm betting on the AI transition, with few H responders.
In the case of voice-control units, the problem is deeper and more problematic than the lack of performance: the high-end migration that is under way is also not a “safe box”.
High end means leaving the “comfort zone” of low-cost, wide-covered, high-channel density of its own best practices, breaking into the price belts where three stars, glory, millet rivals are more dominant in branding, technology, product mix, consumption phased programmes and supply security.
By contrast, the pronunciation has neither the vertical integration capability of three stars nor the local supply chain advantage of the high-end accumulation of millet rice, and, with little care, it leads to a strategic “no-two”- – Entry markets are forced to yield because of storage costs, and middle- and high-end markets face stronger rivals, losing both the size advantage of the low-price segment and failing to establish a firm foothold in the high-price segment.
It is not yet known whether the pronunciation can hold at higher prices; however, in the face of the double squeeze of storage price increases and profit collapses, the pronunciation gives the word “shout narrative” to use AI as a catcher to support brand premiums and valuations.
In 2026, before the IPO landed, three investor exchange sessions of the Voice Control Unit exploded: on 27 March, there were 196 institutions, on 28 April, 118 institutions, on 18 August, and on 18 August, there were 152 institutions, three times a total of 383; on 9 September, the company also participated in the collective performance statement for the creative “Associated Smart Industry”. The heat of such research is significantly higher than that of consumer electronics.
In intensive research, the pronunciation shows investment agencies an AI list: H equity fund-raising will make AI-related technology research and development a top priority — approximately HK$ 2,968 million net at final distribution prices, of which about 40 per cent (approximately HK$ 1,190 million) goes to AI-related research and development; technically, it covers 3 billion-parameter end-side models that can be run on medium- and low-end chips, localized small-language voice recognition, AI automatic listening, voice-mitigating, summary calls, photo solvers, etc.; mobile Internet operations drive “soft and hard synergies” around OS; and expanded products range from accessories, home appliances to storage energy.
With this vision of "end-side AI+Moved Internet + Storage, Electric Travel + nearly 300 million Live Users" the Pronunciation Control Unit launched the H distribution. However, the embarrassment followed.
See first-hand distribution: the sale price is set directly at the lower limit between HK$35.30 and HK$38.80; the public offer is accepted only 4.46 times (tens or hundreds of times the new A+H stock) and the share of the public sale is maintained at 10 per cent without any return; the international offer is accepted 2.55 times, with 51 partners;
Eleven of the cornerstone investors targeted about 40 per cent of their sales shares, including industrial chain partners such as Jiang Poloon, Hong Chiu, Biadi's industrial chain partners such as Kim Heung Globe, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Digimoc, which, with $30 million, became the largest of the subscriptions, forming a “mutual building block” with their H shares previously incorporated in the pronunciation; the top 10 partners accounted for 85.8 per cent of the international distribution... The overall data sets out a picture that relies on discounts and the building blocks for “securing” rather than “securing” the market.
On 15 October, the opening of the H stock broke. After more than a dozen trading days, stock prices have been shattering between HK$32 and HK$38, mostly below the issue price, and nearly 50 per cent below the A equity discount, with capitalist investors generally in a state of loss; daily turnover is high, with exchange rates generally below 1 per cent. In this year's intensive “A+H” new unit, the acoustic H stock has become quite nuanced.
The pre-publishing and pre- and post-branded research fire of H created a stark contrast, reflecting doubts in international capital markets about their profitability and “AI labels”: the pronunciation identified AI as the main direction for technological inputs and product upgrading, but management made it clear that it did not directly compete for generic LLM, focusing on localization. Under this strategy, the “AI grab” can “capture” the amount of money that goes beyond the mobile phone, and the market has no idea.
For the moment, the acoustic moat (localized capacity, network of channels and low-cost size) is still in existence, but the main product has yet to emerge from the “heavy disaster zone” where the price increases are stored, and the moat's borders are being eroded by rising costs and competition.
Next, there is very limited room for acoustics to move, whether the price increases continue to be raised or the configurations adjusted: higher prices may further stifle demand and reduced matching may reduce product competitiveness. In a context where cost shocks are difficult to fully absorb, balancing market shares with profitability has become a dilemma.
For voice-control shares, the AAI transformation is no longer an added gain, but rather a survival war about whether it can break the growth bottlenecks and reshape the profit model.
This is the first time I've got a titanium media app.
Auto-fetched and translated by AI Atlas. All rights belong to the original author.