在Anthropic临近IPO之际，其公司治理结构让普通股股东对包括董事会人选在内的多数重大决策缺乏话语权。Anthropic是一家公共福利公司（public benefit company），即法律允许公司在追求利润的同时兼顾公共使命的营利性公司，其目标是促进AI安全。该身份保护董事会就AI安全作出不完全由股东价值驱动的决定，而免于被愤怒投资者起诉。
目前，董事会由Anthropic总裁丹妮拉·阿莫代伊（Daniela Amodei）担任主席，成员包括CEO达里奥·阿莫代伊（Dario Amodei，她的兄弟）、Netflix联合创始人里德·哈斯廷斯（Reed Hastings）、前微软和通用汽车首席财务官克里斯托弗·利德尔（Christopher Liddell）、诺华CEO万思瀚（Vas Narasimhan）以及Spark Capital合伙人亚斯明·拉扎维（Yasmin Razavi）。董事会有一个空缺。
其次，Anthropic将董事会的重要控制权分配给长期利益信托（LTBT），这是一个独立小组，旨在让公司专注于造福人类的使命。该信托持有一类股票，有权选举和罢免公司多数董事，即Class T董事。LTBT由全球健康专家尼尔·沙阿（Neil Shah）担任主席，他曾是慈善评级非营利组织GiveWell的董事总经理，成员包括前美联储主席本·伯南克（Ben Bernanke）、国家安全专家理查德·方丹（Richard Fontaine）和哈佛物理学家克里斯托弗·斯塔布斯（Christopher Stubbs）。LTBT目前有一个空缺，现有成员将自行选择补缺者。
第三，Anthropic的七名创始人还共同持有一类特殊股票，使其中多数人拥有50.1%的股东投票权，从而能够选举三名董事会成员。若因任何原因创始人们无法形成多数，他们的股票才会按普通股股东比例投票。
最后，董事会对LTBT形成制衡。当LTBT提名其四名董事中的一名“指定”董事，或在无因情况下罢免该董事（即未指控不当行为）时，董事会的提名委员会可以拒绝批准，并将决定交给公司员工投票。
这种复杂结构的动态难以预测。报道提到，类似结构曾实质上被推翻：OpenAI董事会曾因担心CEO萨姆·奥特曼（Sam Altman）未坦诚相待而短暂解雇他，但由于员工对奥特曼的忠诚，董事会退让、恢复其职位，并建立了新的治理结构。Anthropic的结构似乎将这种员工权力制度化。
在Anthropic，创始人统一阵线若出现裂痕，普通股东可能获得比预期更多的话语权；而如果员工支持董事会而非信托，他们可以在董事会席位问题上压倒LTBT。
创始人的控制不会永远持续：IPO十年后，创始人们可以选择结束对公司的控制，或者当创始人们少于三人时控制自动结束。届时，LTBT将持续存在，直到85%的普通股股东投票决定结束它，或者它经董事会批准决定退出。若两类特殊股东都不复存在——报道称希望不是因为AI引发的灾难——普通股东才会最终获得控制权。
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As Anthropic approaches IPO, its corporate governance structure leaves ordinary shareholders with little voice to most major decisions, including board candidates. Anthropic is a public freebie company (public benefit company) that is a profit-making company whose aim is to promote AI by allowing companies to pursue their profits while balancing their public mission. The Board took decisions on AI security that were not driven exclusively by shareholder values and were not subject to prosecution by angry investors.
At present, the Board is chaired by Daniela Amodei, President of Anthropic, and composed of the CEO, Dario Amodei, her brother, the co-founder of Netflix, Reed Hastings, the former Chief Financial Officer of Microsoft and General Motors, Christopher Liddell, Vas Narasimhan, and the partner of Spark Capital, Yasmin Razavi. There is one vacancy on the Board.
Second, Anthropic has allocated important control over the board to the Long-term Interest Trust (LTBT), an independent group designed to focus on the corporate mission for the benefit of humanity. The trust holds a category of shares and has the right to elect and dismiss the majority of the company ' s directors, namely, Class T. LTBT is chaired by Neil Shah, a global health expert, who was the Managing Director of the non-profit charity rating organization GiveWell, and its members include Ben Bernanke, a former Federal Reserve Chairman, Richard Fontaine, a national security expert, and Christopher Stubbs, a Harvard physicist. There is currently one vacancy in the LTB, and the current members will choose their own fill.
Thirdly, the seven founders of Anthropic also jointly held a special category of shares, which gave the majority 50.1 per cent of shareholders the right to vote, enabling the election of three board members. If, for any reason, the founders were unable to form a majority, their shares would be cast in proportion to the ordinary shareholders.
Finally, the Board checks and balances on LTTE. When LTTE nominates one of its four directors as a “designated” director or dismisses the director for no reason (i.e. without alleging misconduct), the nomination committee of the board of directors may refuse to approve the decision and hand it to the company's employees to vote.
The dynamics of this complex structure are difficult to predict. It was mentioned that a similar structure had been substantially overturned: the Open AI Board of Directors had briefly dismissed CEO Sam Altman for fear of not being honest, but because of the loyalty of its staff to Otman, the Board had given up, reinstated its position and established a new governance structure. The structure of Anthropic seems to institutionalize such employee authority.
In Anthropic, if there were cracks in the United Front of Founders, ordinary shareholders might have more voice than expected; and if staff supported the board of directors than the trust, they could override the LTBT seat on the board.
The control of the founders will not last forever: ten years later, the founders can choose to end control of the company, or automatically when fewer than three founders. At that time, LTBT will remain in existence until 85 per cent of ordinary shareholders vote to terminate it or it withdraws with the approval of the Board. If both categories of special shareholders no longer exist — and it is reported that it is not because of the catastrophe caused by AI — ordinary shareholders will eventually gain control.
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